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· Introduction
The spanish liability system grants the victim a right against the injurer to claim
damages for the total loss suffered as a result of an accident. Subsequently parties make
decisions at different stages affecting the way their legal conflict shall be solved, either:
A. Asking the Courts to enforce their rights, which may eventually lead to a trial
and its subsequent verdict.
B. Bargaining a settlement prior to the Court's decision.
Over the past few years we have witnessed significant legal reforms in the way they do
so, as reactions to criticisms regarding the system’s poor performance in the consecution
of its goals. The most relevant of those changes is without any doubts the binding
valuation system that compels the judiciary to a legally reckoned set of tables when
estimating damage awards.
How does that change affect subsequent litigation within the tort system?
This paper tries to address the question from an objectively based analytical approach,
using the economic analysis of litigation1, as briefly presented in Section I. Then the
multiple results of the analysis are shown in section II, and Section III summarises
concluding remarks and points out further extensions.
The comparison brought here is one between two alternative legal frameworks for post–
accident litigation, before and after that new piece of legislation came into force, namely,
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A. one with an open valuation system, versus
B. another characterised by a tabular approach, in which damage awards must be
extracted by the judge out a legal binding matrix.
That is, from a previous situation in which the judge is left unbounded and absolutely
free to set the level of damages to be awarded, versus the new scenario of 1995. Since
then, a legal table leaves the judge the only task of deciding about the facts –actual
damage–, but not about the quantity of the payment set for both economic and non–
pecuniary compensation. A recent judicial review process before the Constitutional
Court has spoiled the chance of removing sound errors from it as it left 1995 legal
reform almost unaffected2.
This paper builds on standard litigation models seeking to identify and forecast the
effects –both in terms of the costs and incentives– set by this legal reform on the way
cases are litigated. This task not being fulfilled prior to its promulgation led to current
legal problems and social inefficiencies brought by the new system, including the open
rejection of the Supreme Court and the aforementioned judicial review. Instead,
proponents of the legal reform just claimed it would immediately reduce the outraging
levels of Court litigation, but did so without any analytical basis. The elementary model
sketched here points, in some cases, in directions contrary to that intuition.
· Section I: Dispute resolution and parties' predictions
A standard decisional model of litigation can be used to identify the effects of legal
reform on dispute resolution. Such analytical tool offers a mean to describe the
relationship between the way litigants choose to solve their conflict, that is their the
demand for litigation –settlement versus trial–, as a function of a finite set of variables on
which it depends:
D = f (Qe, Qo, P, C, A, N)
Where
D= Demand for litigation
Qo = Payment set for compensation, as estimated ex ante by the defendant
Qe = Payment set for compensation, similarly predicted by the plaintiff
Q= Payment actually set in trial, thus unknown for the parties until then
P= Objective probability of a plaintiff verdict, used when parties’ estimates on it
coincide, that is, whenever Po= Pe
C= Litigation cost in a trial, also used when parties’ litigation costs coincide, that is, Co=
Ce
A= Costs of negotiating and reaching a settlement out of Court, also assumed to be
symmetrical: Ao= Ae
N= number of claims filed.
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Estimates as random variables. It is obvious to state that the actual value of the
payment the judge would set for compensation –Q– remains unobservable for both
litigants throughout litigation: there is no way they can possibly know in advance what
the judge would decide the injurer must pay, should the case finally end up in trial.
Such value depends not only on the merits of the case, but also on the judge’s own
personal bias, the legal framework, availability of appeal instances, etcetera. This
uncertainty makes necessary for the parties to base their decisions on estimates, though
it’s actually their lawyers knowledge and experience in previous cases that play a
starring role at doing so. The spanish legal system’s mandatory third party insurance
coverage for drivers, jointly with the specialisation achieved through frequent
agreements between many lawyers and insurance companies turn the former into real
repeated players of this «game». Moreover those lawyers’ incentives for litigating don’t
always go along with those of their clients.
There are two major ingredients underlying the formation of these estimates:
1) Available information on similar cases –precedents–. Which is highly dependent on
the level of «noise» generated by variability in awards.
2) The attitude of the parties themselves, which as far as we are concerned in this paper
shall be comprised to them being either optimistic or pessimistic.
This bias in parties’ predictions has usually been considered to regard their estimates on
the probability of prevailing in trial, but as will soon be shown we’ve taken optimism
and pessimism into account as they affect not probabilities –Po and Pe– but estimates on
damages awarded by the Courts, that is Qo and Qe.
The fact that the stakes in the case –Q– remain unobserved throughout the entire
litigation process blocks the way for its use during that time, as a certain value that can
be associated to a real number. This compels the parties to build and then use those
aforementioned estimates or forecasts as proxies to the potential value of Q. Those
predictions of the parties perfectly match the concept of a random variable. This allows
us to consider the whole range of probable values as a probability distribution, so that:
Qe is the plaintiff’s estimate of the judicial outcome,
Qo is the defendant’s.
As both try to come as close as possible to the –unknown– future value actually set by
the Court, Q, with the limited information available to each, they incur in a certain
degree of error causing those estimates to become stochastic. That is,
Qe=Q+ee y Qo=Q+eo. Where ee ~N(me, de) y eo ~N(mo, do)
Two simple assumptions are made about those subjective estimates in order to make
them easier to handle. Neither one seems to distort reality significantly, while they very
much do make analysis a lot straightforward. These are:
1) Parties’ predictions are treated as normally distributed3 random variables
that may, though don’t necessarily have to share mean and variance values.
The Central Limit Theorem applies easily due to the large amount of conflicts
making the sample up.
InDret 4/2000                                                                           Jesús Pintos Ager
4
Qe ~ N(me,s2e)
Qo ~ N(mo,s2o)
2) Both predictions are probabilistically independent from each other4. This
assumption is not strictly necessary, but does make the handling of the
difference of the two distributions a lot easier, without pulling the model away
from the reality it represents. After making this second assumption, the
difference between both parties’ estimates depends only on their mean and
variance, not on the covariance –the importance of that difference will soon be
brought up–:
Cov [Qe,Qo] = 0
Settlement and trial. The rationale behind the model is in fact a rather straightforward
and intuitive idea: there will be a settlement out of Court whenever the plaintiff’s
minimum request does not exceed the maximum amount the defendant is willing to
offer, both depending on the expected value given by each one to the final verdict, net of
litigation costs.
For the plaintiff to be interested in a settlement offer, this has to match, at least, the
amount he expects to win in trial, discounting the probability of that happening and net
of litigation costs
plaintiff’s minimum willingness to settle threshold = P*Qe–C+A
on the other side, the defendant will be willing to offer an amount up to what he thinks
he can lose in trial, times the probability of that happening, plus the costs he would
incur while trying to avoid that undesired outcome:
defendant’s maximum willingness to pay threshold = P*Qo+C–A
Therefore, they can be expected to reach a settlement whenever the case meets the
following condition:
P*Qe–C+A < P*Qo+C–A
This condition for settlement can be rewritten in terms of the predicted award, which represent
the core of our analysis. Then there will be settlement whenever the probability –P– and the
costs –C, A– relate to the predictions in the following way:
Qe–Qo < 2 * (C–A) / P
This expression of that simple idea highlights the great importance of the resulting
function of subtracting both parties’ estimates -hereinafter referred to as the
«discrepancy»- to our analysis. Now both plaintiff’s and defendant’s decision about
whether to file a suit, at first and whether to bring it to trial or settle an agreement out of
Court instead, depend basically on the payment those parties predict they might face,
on the probability of it being imposed and on the effort and resources they devote to
achieve a favourable outcome. This is very helpful since new legislation basically affects
the distribution of that discrepancy, and therefore all attention shall be directed to it by
considering C, A and P to be constants in any certain case.
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Once stated that estimates behave stochastically, it must be noted that the error in which
parties incur when estimating the awards depends on two main features:
A) The foreseability of the compensation the judge is likely to set. That is, the
availability and quality of information regarding previous judgements in similar
cases.
B) The presence of pessimism or optimism in the formation of the predictions.
Let us now go back to the process of developing those estimates to then go on to see
how it is affected by the aforementioned legal reform.
· Section II: Incentives for litigation before and after tort reform being passed5
How do schedules for personal injury awards affect the variables upon which we’ve
made the resolution of legal conflicts dependent?
Changes in Q. The most relevant effect is the one over the damage awards, more
precisely, over the random variables by which parties try to approach to it, Qe and Qo.
In order to focus on the changes caused by tort reform in the way Courts award
damages, other variables of the function for the demand of litigation are assumed to be
certain and known by the parties. The presence of optimism has traditionally been
modelled as affecting P, the variable representing the parties’ subjective estimate on
probability of a plaintiff verdict. More precisely, optimistic plaintiffs tend to
overestimate their chances of prevailing in trial; while optimistic defendants understate
the probability of suffering a plaintiff verdict. This effect has largely been addressed by
the literature.
Since this paper seeks to determine the effects of scheduling awards for personal injury,
I’ve concentrated on the random variables Qe and Qo, which are usually considered
deterministic in traditional models. That implies other relevant parameters as wining
probabilities, litigation or settlement costs being left aside so damage awards
monopolise all the attention.
In order to make accurate comparisons among different quantities awarded under the
two legal scenarios, before and after tort reform, we must assume to be comparing the
same type of accident horizontally, that is to say that the victim’s relevant features
remain unchanged so we can concentrate on changes exclusively due to tort reform.
1. The liability regime prior to reform
a. Error 1: Optimism (distancing of the means of the estimates)
Judicial discretion offers an excellent breeding ground for the most typical error litigants
tend to incur in the estimation of the stakes of the case. As a matter of fact it’s lawyers
who are broadly responsible for those estimations and have strong incentives to
generate an optimistic bias; more so in Spain where their fees usually depend on the
stakes of the case, but not on its outcome, leading to serious moral hazard problems.
Therefore optimistic plaintiffs tend to incur on systematic overestimation of the value of
the future award; whereas an optimistic defendant will understate the expected trial
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outcome he would have to face, should that probability come to fact.
The consequence of these biases in the estimations is quite straightforward: it generates
a separation of their distributions as both parties stand harder on their pre–trial
negotiation positions, thus making the chances of reaching an out of Court agreement
become slim. Obviously, pessimism plays the opposite role, bringing estimates together.
In the model presented in this paper, optimism and pessimism have to do with the
separation between parties’ estimates as it affects the mean value of their distributions.
Determining whether optimism or pessimism in trial outcome estimations is the actual
trend for a certain legal environment points out crucial. The first brings the parties’
estimates apart from each other increasing the positive difference between me and mo
which correspondingly does shift the discrepancy to the right, as it increases its mean
value (me–mo). Contrarily to that, pessimism reduces me while it increases mo and this in
turn increases the negative difference of the discrepancy, so it gets shifted towards the
left.  What the following Graphics actually represent is «symmetric optimism», in the
sense that both predictions are equidistant from the final value taken by the award –Q–
though always with the plaintiff’s to the right and the defendant’s to the left of the real
Q. That equals to assume that both litigants are quantitatively as optimistic one each
other. Undoubtedly, the more optimistic litigants become, the bigger the gap between
them, and thus less likely shall they reach an agreement. The contrary assumption of
pessimism would indeed add more ambiguity the model.
b. Error 2: Uncertainty about the expected award (high variance)
Informational problems surrounding the expected judgement get directly passed on to
parties’ estimates, thus striking the accuracy of their predictions. Such errors show up
through the variances of those estimates, se2  so2 In absence of any objective guidelines
to value damages arisen from serious injuries, the judiciary tend to produce erratic
decisions. This is claimed to generate extreme differences between payments awarded
for similar accidents, not only within the same legal system, but even within the same
jurisdiction in short periods of time. This situation affects the distribution of Q –awards
actually set for similar accidents– undermining its consistency by means of
unpredictable variability, thus leading to extremely disperse shapes for the distribution
of parties’ previsions –Qe and Qo–, in short, high variances. Surprisingly, a first glance
set of data show similar variation coefficients for spanish awards prior to reform and
those set in the U.S. for pain & suffering alone6.
Graphic 1
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Settlement area   Trial  area
Qo Qe
1-F(2(C-A)/P)
 Q
Qe-Qo
 2*(C-A)/P
Graphic 1 shows both errors. The latter –error 2– consists on the unforeseability of
estimates with skewed shapes on potential award in Qe and Qo density functions. This
in turn makes most of the probability mass lie well apart from the mean values of both
estimates. While the former error 1 –optimism– brings estimates apart from the central
but unobservable value of the judgement actually passed for the case, Q, thus shifting
the discrepancy to the right.
It is important for the clarity of our analysis to draw a clear distinction between these
two effects –optimism and unforeseability– over the mean and the variance of the
distributions of the estimates. The difference between the plaintiff’s estimate –Qe– and
the defendant’s –Qo–, Qe–Qo is at the core of that analysis, and Graphic 1 thus sketches
its appearance.
Since those estimates adopt the form of normally distributed probability functions, we
know that the distribution of the difference between them, Qe–Qo, will also be another
random variable with a normal distribution whose mean value will be the difference
between the estimate’s means, and whose variance is the sum of the estimate’s
variances. The reason why those estimates where assumed to be independent one each
other was to avoid having to deal with the covariance7 between them, which
unnecessarily hinders the analysis.
Qe–Qo ~ N[(me–mo),(se2+so2)]
In that distribution, the probability mass associated with the chances of that case ending
up in a trial is represented by the black area, whereas the non–shaded area represents
the probability of that case being settled. Put in an algebraic expression, and taking Qe–
Qo=x, the probability mass of settling the case is equal to
2(c–a)/p
Fx (2(c–a)/p)= 1/2ps2  e–(x–m)2/2s2dx
–
That is, the area of the density function to the right of the critical point, 2(c–a)/p.
Social costs of variability. The whole situation described above matches the automobile
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accident liability regime in Spain prior to 1995, and entails several social costs, namely:
1. The use of Court verdicts for the resolution of conflicts that could have been more
efficiently closed by out of Court settlements, and viceversa, are main relevant
sources of the malfunction of the dispute resolution system as well as immediate
causes of both private and social costs8.
2. Among those, an excessively high litigation rate –or a suboptimal number of
settlements– generates harmful side effects as delay and jamming in the Courts.
Then accidents take up Courts’ time and resources for the resolution of disputes for
which the most efficient solution is a different one, thus detracting them from cases
that really deserve access to justice.
3. Litigation costs being significantly larger than those incurred when the dispute is
settled also contributes to worsen the aforementioned costs9, more so in Spain after
the public component of litigation costs are mostly suffered by contributors since
1986.
4. The insurance market plays a central role here. Although there is a clear incentive
for insurers to make the problem appear bigger that it is, the unforeseability of
awards puts them in dire straits when they have to endow resources for the awards
they’ll have to pay for in the future. This is allegedly the case of the spanish
automobile insurance industry during the eighties: From 183 companies in 1979
there where only 118 left in the sector by 1993, out of which only 92 made some
profit. The results in 1990 where of 73.000 million pesetas lost by the entire sector,
decreasing to 48.000 million pesetas for 1992. But those figures seem suspicious
alone, with no further analysis since they very well could be the result of a selection
process. The most inefficient ones just could be forced to leave a market as they fail
to adjust premiums charged to their risks against which they offered coverage. This
effect has recently been addressed and empirically tested by BORN & VISCUSI10.
2. Effects of the legal reform capping and scheduling damages
a. Effect 1: Reduction of optimism (regrouping of the means)
Introducing a legal schedule that objectively reckons the award set for accident
compensation reduces the grounds left for optimistic bias in the parties’ predictions
about the potential outcome of a trial. The immediate effect to be expected is the closing
of the gap between plaintiff’s and defendant’s estimates about that outcome which
implies both becoming closer to each other towards the certain value of Q.
GRAPHIC EF1
QQo Qe
E(Qo) E(Qe)
This convergence of the distributions is shown in GRAPHIC EF1.The table has caused a
centripetal attraction force around point Q, thus causing the discrepancy –Qe-Qo– to
shift to the left. This happens because the discrepancy’s mean value is equal to the
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difference between those of the litigants’ estimates and with that difference being
reduced as a result of legal reform, the distribution is moved towards the left, thus
rendering a greater probability mass to the left side –settlement– of the critical point,
which remains in the same position. In short, the first partial effect in litigation one can
expect from the promulgation of a schedule for damage awards points in the direction
of a higher settlement rate.
SETTLE          TRIAL
2*(C-A)/P
 Qe-Qo
The contrary. It goes without saying that should pessimism be the case in litigants’
estimates, then a schedule that corrects it would actually have the opposite effect,
causing trial rates to rise as parties would tend to play harder in pre trial negotiations,
thus narrowing the interval in which an agreement needs to be reached. This is how
ambiguity shows up in the model starting from this first EFFECT 1.
b. EFFECT 2: More homogeneous awards (reduction of the variances)
It intuitively seems quite straightforward that scheduling awards will significantly
reduce the dispersion of the real awards set by the Courts –Q– as well as the parties’
estimates on them –Qe and Qo–. Accordingly, this will necessarily lead to a reduction in
the variance of those estimates, as they must become centred closer to their mean values.
That is exactly what GRAPHIC EF2 shows with more stylised distributions for Qe and
Qo.
 GRAPHIC EF2
Qo Qe
E(Qo) E(Qe)
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As previously explained, if the discrepancy’s distribution is
Qe–Qo ~ N[(me–mo),(se2+so2)]
these parallel effects in the parties’ individual estimates get in turn passed on to their
discrepancy, which was previously defined as the difference between those estimates.
Then ¿how will that change affect dispute resolution, that is, the settlement/trial rates?
As for EFFECT 1, the probability of settlement was made dependent on probability of
winning and both litigation and settlement costs. We also know how that probability is
distributed –normally–, so we can thus put those variables together and compare how
they interact céteris páribus before and after the liability reform considered here. This in
fact involves applying the litigation model presented in Section I to the changes in its
variables described in Section II.
However, the remaining variables yield the highest probability of settlement when
litigation is relatively expensive face to face to settlement, and the difference between
those two costs is significant compared to the stakes of the case, that is, when
                                    (Ce+Co) – (Ae+A0)
Max{––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––} => Min D
                                                   Q
Section I showed that for a case to be settled, the parties’ predictions about its final
outcome needed to relate to the costs of litigation and the probability of rendering a
plaintiff verdict in the way shown by the following identity,
Qe–Qo < 2 * (C–A) / P
This means that the condition necessary for an out–of–Court agreement to take place is
that the parties’ discrepancy about the final award does not exceed the total litigation
costs net of settlement costs and divided by the probability of a plaintiff verdict.
Hereinafter that value 2*(C–A)/P shall be referred to as the «critical point», represented
by a certain value lying on the horizontal axe of the discrepancy’s density function, as a
benchmark that will split that density function in two, resulting two cumulative
distribution functions. Those two areas left at each side of the critical point each
represent the probabilities of settlement and trial.
Ambivalence. Substituting judicial discretion for a tabular approach to damages should
result in an increase on the quality of predictions about trial outcome and corresponding
improvement of estimations. That particularly affects our analysis reducing variances in
both estimates’ density functions and therefore the discrepancy becomes more accurate
as well. Changes in the subsequent probabilities of trial and settlement are to be
expected after estimates become more stylised, as probability mass gathers up closer to
the mean. But a problem arises when one tries to evaluate the effect of this change on
the way disputes are solved: lt is not a one–way effect but a twofold one, depending on
which side of the discrepancy’s density function is cut by the critical point. This
quandary can only be overcome by distinguishing two alternative scenarios. Otherwise,
tort reform consisting in a personal injury schedule may either result in an increase of
settlement rates or operate in the opposite direction.
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SCENARIO A: Litigation costs are large compared to those incurred for settlement
and/or probability of a plaintiff verdict is low, so that the point 2(C–A)/P exceeds the
mean value of the discrepancy –lies on its right side–, even after being shifted to the left
by EFFECT 1.
2*(C–A)/P Î ( (me–mo), Max{Qe–Qo}), graphically
SETTLE              TRIAL
2*(C-A)/P
 Qe-Qo
MEAN VALUE
Then what EFFECT 2 is really doing, by stretching the distribution upwards and
concentrating probability around the mean value of that distribution, is in fact switching
some probability mass from the right shaded side –p. of trial– to the left non shaded tail
–settlement– of the discrepancy. Thus under SCENARIO 1, EFFECT 2 decreases the
probability of the case ending up in trial and being this a dycotomic model,
correspondingly reduces the chances of reaching an agreement. Therefore, if all other
variables remain the same, céteris páribus this effect would add up in the same direction
as EFFECT 1, both rendering a higher settlement rate as a results of legal reform.
SCENARIO B: When litigation costs are low and/or the chances of a plaintiff verdict are
important the value of 2(C–A)/P is more likely to be smaller that the mean value of the
discrepancy. SCENARIO B is characterised by the fact that the critical point 2(C–A)/P
falls on the left tail of the discrepancy, even after EFFECT 1 has moved the distribution
to the left. Under this assumption any reduction on the variance of the discrepancy
steals probability mass from the left –settlement area– to the right side –trial– of the
distribution area. GRAPHIC 3 describes this situation and substitutes GRAPHIC 2 when
A,C and P and the estimates behave as follows:
2*(C–A)/P Î (Min{Qe–Qo}, (me–mo)), graphically
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SETTLEMENT            TR IAL
2*(C -A)/P
 m Q e -Qo
In the situation described as SCENARIO B, EFFECT 2 contravenes EFFECT 1 causing
ambiguity to show up in the model. As the net effect of these two remain an empirical
question demanding currently unavailable data, an increase in settlement rates cannot
be attributed unquestionably to tort reform introducing a schedule for personal damage
awards, contrary to what its proponents and the legislator held prior to its adoption.
Marginality and overall perspective. One must not forget that cases affected by this
effect in reality are not all, but only those ones «in the limit». Those discrepancy
distributions lying far away enough so they’re not cut by the critical point are indifferent
to tort reform’s EFFECTS 1 and 211. Contrary to what happens in those cases, these two
effects tend to be more intense the more rigid the schedule is, to the extent they narrow
judge’s room for generating variability. An open schedule that, say only defines a set of
scenarios for the judiciary to move freely within, can be expected to affect litigation
relatively less than would a narrow one. For instance, while the spanish schedule of 1995
could give the impression of a narrow one on paper, the way judges tend to
implemented it in day by day tort litigation turns it into a much broader legal
framework than one might initially expect. As a matter of fact, diverging interpretations
dash all aims put on this reform to restore tort litigation within minimum certainty
requirements. It could be said that the enforcement vector of such reform is small.
Fortunately, a Constitutional Court decision in june 2000 has just recognized the binding
effects of the schedule for judges.
3. Litigation costs and risk aversion
Not even settlement –not to mention Litigation– is for free. Putting an end to a legal
dispute is at least a time demanding activity. One doesn’t need to resort to one of those
notorious legal cases that bring parties into an endless labyrinth of instances and appeals
to understand how expensive and stressing litigation can get. A handful of popular
sayings illustrate those snags including one’s lawyer’s fees, legal experts asked to report
their opinion in Court, time devoted, anxiety, restlessness, lack of sleep. Those are
known to be considerable not only when one has to walk into the Courthouse, but also
in those cases settled.
Those litigation costs –C– are intuitively in a negative relationship with the demand for
litigation itself: the most expensive an activity is the smaller people’s willingness to
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carry it out, and the most are willing to choose the alternative. The closest substitute for
litigation is settlement, and so that explains why people tend to move to it as the cost of
bringing their case to Court becomes a relatively more expensive alternative. That
explains why C take a negative value in the plaintiff’s minimum settlement petition
while settlement costs –A– are positive. The plaintiff asks for an amount of money at
least equal to what he expects to get out of trial, net of litigation costs he would not have
to eventually incur then, plus settlement costs, thus transferred on to the defendant who
makes the offer.
A personal injury schedule reduces both settlement and litigation costs, even if we
assume it not to affect causation problems. Even then, the cost of valuing those damages
is less in presence of a legal rule acting as a link between those damages attributed to the
injurer and the amount of money the victim deserves as compensation. One must expect
people to «buy» more court solutions to their problems as the «price» they pay for it
decreases. For the same reason, settlement costs are lower when a schedule is used, thus
providing a contrary incentive to settle. This is how again we must face conflicting
effects, turning our theoretical model ambiguous once again.
Risk aversion as a way of optimism. As in general risk averse parties are those who
prefer the most secure among several choices of the same expected value, when applied
to defendants and plaintiffs, this attitude towards risk results in a general preference for
settlement as the certain alternative face to face the more uncertain trial outcome.
Therefore these can be expected to be willing to settle for some half–way compromise
and not to «continue gambling» to either get or have to pay a higher amount should the
case be sentenced by a third party. Thus it can be said that their positions get closer as
they ease their stances if pre–trial negotiations. How shall a schedule affect that attitude?
A tort reform embodying a tabular approach to previously unpredictable damage
awards will tend to undercut open–ended variability, thus removing uncertainty from
the parties’ estimations on the final outcome expected in trial. All things being equal,
lower levels of uncertainty about the stakes of the case will reduce litigants’ aversion to
that unknown outcome, since it is now more easily predictable by means of the schedule
and judges allegiance to its values. That means turning trials into a less fearful
alternative to settlement. Litigants develop more accurate predictions and thus they
become relatively less afraid of jeopardising the certain amount they could assure in a
settlement in exchange for more attracting prospects should they continue.
This way a schedule would in fact be undercutting risk aversion’s effect on parties and
thus making them more confident or optimistic on the expected uncertain alternative.
4. To sue or not to sue
Once having sketched the effects of the new liability regime on the way disputes are
solved –Q– it comes the time to tackle those over the number of legal claims actually
filed, that is to say that the relevant parameter of the model shall now be N: the number
of legal conflicts made explicit by the victims’ decision to sue the injurer.
The analysis required to address this question is rather simpler than the one already
shown in previous sections. The victim must establish a comparison between the
expected value of a verdict rendered after trial and the costs –effort and resources–
devoted to accomplish that favourable outcome, which can be presented in quite
straightforward terms:
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Accordingly to this simple scheme, the victim’s decision about the legal claim will
depend on the following identity. There are incentives for her to sue whenever doing so
is cost justified:
C < P * Qe
Note that as done before uncertainty has been limited as to the amount eventually set in
trial; not about whether that will be the outcome, as most litigation models usually do.
This in fact may be put in terms of the victims’ estimate on what she could recover:
Qe > C / P => The victim decides to sue and thus become a plaintiff
Since the effects of tort reform on estimates have already been defined, results here are a
simplified version of what previously happened in this section.
a. Effect 1: Reduction of optimism (decrease in the estimate’s mean value)
Removing optimism away from the plaintiff’s behaviour means he will not over–
estimate the potential award or at least that he will do so to a lesser extent. Then the
distribution of his estimate will shift towards the left, closer to Q and the effect on
litigation is clear. Given the point C/P remains constant after legal reform then there
will result more probability mass to the left side of the distribution, which happens to be
the not filing zone. Again, this result is consistent with one’s first intuition: fewer claims
are expected to be filed since the subjective stakes decrease for the plaintiff. Of course
once the cost reduction effects of the schedule are taken into account both collide against
each other.
b. Effect 2: More homogeneous awards (reduction of the estimate’s variance)
As Section II shows in detail, tables centre the random variable Qe around its mean
value so that that estimates’ distribution variance becomes smaller. Again this effect
over N depends on the relative values of Qe, P and C which lead to the need of
differentiating two alternative scenarios similar to those previously defined in this
section:
SCENARIO C:
The costs are so high and/or the probability of a plaintiff verdict so low that C/P
exceeds the mean value of Qe, that is,
C/P Î (me, Max{Qe}); or more clearly, C/P > me
That places the critical point C/P on the right tail of the distribution so that once new
legislation comes into force probability mass moves from the right to the left side of
C/P. Being the former the not filing region, less claims should then reach the Courts.
This effect adds up to the preceding one.
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Qe C/P
Not filing zone                Filing zone
SCENARIO D
The costs are low and/or the probability of the plaintiff wining the case is high enough
so that:
C/P < me
This meaning the critical point falls now in the left –not filing– tail of the plaintiff’s
estimate distribution, thus a reduction of its variance removes probability mass and
relocates it in the contrary, which is the situation in which filing a claim makes sense for
the victim. This again brings ambiguity back to the model, as EFFECT 1 acts against this
EFFECT 2 in SCENARIO D.
Qe
C/P
Not to sue         Suing is attractive
· Section III: Concluding remarks
Tort reform. Two legal settings have been compared here face to face for valuing
personal injury compensation within the liability system. On one hand an open
valuation system where the judge is granted wide powers to evaluate the scope of
compensable damages without constraint. In the opposite there is a recent tort reform
which recently came into force in Spain for traffic accidents. Under this new system
awards are automatically reckoned by a set of legal tables or matrices, thus leaving the
judiciary with extremely slim chances to stray away from that schedule.
Two Effects. This legislation affects dispute resolution by means of causing the following
two effects in litigation:
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EFFECT 1: Removing optimism away from the litigants’ predictions about
compensation potentially awarded in trial make these more accurate in the sense
that both parties’ estimates become closer to reality in average.
EFFECT 2: Reducing the random error litigants make when forecasting the
amount they expect to be awarded by the Court. This leads to a decrease in the
variances  of their estimates.
Where do those effects arise? The aforementioned effects have their bearing on two of
the variables that explain whether disputes are put an end by settlement or trial:
Q = Payment finally awarded for compensation by the Court
Tort reform’s EFFECT 1 over Q is straightforward: more cases are solved by settlements
instead of being brought to trial. But even that effect’s sign depends on the assumption
one makes about how parties develop their estimates. It only holds in case they
incur in an optimistic bias; should pessimism be the case, a schedule would in
fact come to reduce settlement rates.
EFFECT 2 over Q is twofold but it can be identified using litigation costs and
probability of a plaintiff verdict as a benchmark to define two alternative
situations:
A) If the difference between the plaintiff and the defendant estimate
does not exceed in average the critical point 2(C–A)/P, then this
EFFECT 2 consists on an increase of the settlement rate, adding up to
the preceding ones. This is SCENARIO A:
 me–mo < 2(C–A)/P
B) If the situation happens to be the contrary –SCENARIO B–, that is
parties disagree in mean values more than the point 2(C–A)/P
2*(C–A)/P Î (me–mo, Max{Qe–Qo})
then the new regime increases the demand for trials and causes
less cases to be settled out of Court. Then EFFECT 2 over Q is
against some others already studied so ambiguity appears in the
model.
N = Number of suits being filed as a result of the victim’s –plaintiff– decision to
sue the injurer –defendant.
EFFECT 1 over N mimics what happened with Q: it decreases the number of
claims filed, which reduces the demand for litigation, but only once given that
parties behave optimistically.
EFFECT 2 over N is also twofold and depends on the relative values of C, P and
the plaintiff’s Qe in similar terms:
C) If C/P > me there will be less suits filed after damages are subject to legal
provisions.
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D) If C/P < me then the mitigation of the error caused by the legal table leads to
an increase in the amount of cases where filing a legal claim becomes cost–
justified to the victim. This brings ambiguity around again.
· Final conclusion
The analysis carried out in this paper points out that the so presented beneficial effect of
the schedules on litigation is not as straightforward as its proponents, nor a first
intuition show. Since forcing more settlements and less trials was meant to be one of the
three major healing powers of this legal change in the legislator’s agenda, the ambiguity
shown by the model encourages a reconsideration of its social desirability and thus more
attention should be put on its side effects.
SCHEDULE EFFECTS ON LITIGATION
· CORRECTING OPTIMISM
MORE AGREEMENTS
· REDUCED SETTLEMENT COSTS
AMBIGUITY
· REDUCED VARIABILITY
·  WITH RISK AVERSION
MORE TRIALS
· REDUCED LITIGATION COSTS
· CORRECTING PESSIMISM
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